Adam Hanieh interviewed by Farooq Sulehria
February 3, 2012 -- Viewpoint -- Saudi
Arabia, along with other Gulf states, have been key protagonists in the
counter-revolutionary wave unleashed against the Arab uprisings. Indeed,
2011 has clearly demonstrated that imperialism in the region is
articulated with – and largely works through – the Gulf Arab states. "Overall,
it is important for the left to support the ongoing struggles in the
revolutions as the contradictions of the new regimes continue to
sharpen", says Adam Hanieh.
Adam Hanieh is a lecturer in development studies at the School of
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London. He is author
of Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States (Palgrave-Macmillan 2011) and a member of the Editorial Board of the journal Historical Materialism.
Farooq Sulehria: The outcome of elections in Tunisia and Egypt went in favour
of Islamist parties, even though the revolutions in these countries had a
secular character. Islamists are also an integral part, if not the dominant
force, in the revolutions in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain. Is the
Arab Spring in fact a victory for the Islamist movements?
Adam Hanieh: No,
I think this is the wrong way to read the Arab Spring. It is true of
course that the Islamist parties were the major victors in the Egyptian
and Tunisian elections and have been prominent actors in the other
uprisings across the region. But we need to take a more circumspect view
of the Islamist movements and the difficulties they will likely face in
the coming period.
First, we should remember that the initial phases of
the revolutions (certainly in Egypt and Tunisia) arose largely outside
the orbit of established movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood.
In general, the Islamist movements have played – and continue to play – a
conservative role. During the protests in Egypt in December 2011, for
example, the Muslim Brotherhood took a clear stance against the popular
forces. Likewise with the important Egyptian strike wave in September.
These examples (and many others) indicate that while Islamist parties
may have received significant electoral support, their relationship with
the popular movement is fraught with tension and has the potential to
quickly shift. This has also generated schisms and debates within the Muslim Brotherhood
itself.
The election results in Tunisia and Egypt are not
particularly surprising. In Egypt, the strong showing of the Muslim
Brotherhood is partially indicative of its deeper implantation
throughout the society and greater access to resources. Under Mubarak,
the Muslim Brotherhood was, in effect, a semi-legal opposition and it
has a long history of organising across the country. Many other parties
(including some of the parties of the left) have only recently formed
or begun organising openly, and it is impossible to expect them to have
the reach of the Muslim Brotherhood at this stage.
