With tensions again rising in the Persian Gulf, an accident or
provocation around the narrow Strait of Hormuz could precipitate a war.
In this memo for President Obama, 11 former U.S. intelligence officials
urge a U.S.-Iranian system for communications — a “hot line” — in case
of crisis.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
SUBJECT: Avoiding Spiraling Violence in the Persian Gulf
We write respectfully to call your attention to the clear and present
danger of escalation in the Persian Gulf and to suggest ways to lessen
that likelihood. There needs to be a reliable way for our Navy to
communicate at a sufficiently high level with Iranian naval
counterparts. Otherwise, incidents occasioned by accident or provocation
can readily escalate in ways neither side intends.
Map of the waterways near the Strait of Hormuz
This is not a new problem; others (notably former Joint Chiefs of
Staff Chairman Admiral Mike Mullen) have called attention to it in the
past. We do so again because of the sharply increased tensions flowing
from terrorist attacks like the one on July 18 in Bulgaria in which five
Israeli tourists were killed.
It is not yet known who the suicide bomber was. Yet Israeli Prime
Minister Netanyahu immediately blamed Iran and Hezbollah for the attack —
a claim that has not been substantiated — and threatened retaliation.
Inside Iran, terrorist attacks have claimed the lives of five Iranian
scientists over the past five years, with the Iranians blaming Israel.
The recent buildup of warships in the Persian Gulf has added not only
to crowding, but also to a hair-trigger, volatile environment. On July
16, the U.S. Navy announced that a Navy refueling ship out of Bahrain,
the Rappahannock, had used “lethal force” against a 50-foot pleasure
craft, killing one Indian fisherman and seriously injuring three others.
The Navy said the fishermen had been given ample warning, but the
three survivors insisted they had received no warning before being fired
upon. And if that fishing boat had been an Iranian naval vessel?
As that recent shoot-up suggests, the waters of the Gulf offer the
most likely locale for an incident that could spiral out of control. The
navigable part of the Strait of Hormuz is narrow; it is an area where
ships collide. In 2007, for example, the U.S. nuclear submarine USS
Newport News collided with a Japanese oil tanker in the Strait while the
submarine was transiting submerged.
Two years later, the USS Hartford nuclear submarine and the
amphibious USS New Orleans collided in the waters between Iran and the
Arabian Peninsula while on routine security patrols in that crowded
shipping lane. In January 2008, five Iranian boats swarmed three U.S.
warships in the Strait of Hormuz.
The skies over that strategic area have also seen inadvertent
tragedy. On July 3, 1988, the Aegis guided-missile cruiser USS Vincennes
mistakenly shot down an Iranian civilian passenger jetliner, Iran Air
Flight 655 over the Strait of Hormuz, killing all 290 passengers. Iran
Air Flight 655 was on a scheduled daily flight using established air
lanes from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai, when the Vincennes mistakenly
identified it as a fighter aircraft.
The Vincennes had sent a radio warning on the international air
distress frequency, but gave incorrect altitude and position information
on the plane. Thus, even if the Flight 655 crew were tuned in, they may
have thought the warning was directed at some other flight. A U.S. Navy
frigate, the USS Sides, reported that Iranian plane was climbing — not
diving to attack — at the time of the missile strike.
Preventive Measures
At a press conference on July 2, 2008, the JCS Chairman, Admiral Mike
Mullen, said that military-to-military dialogue could “add to a better
understanding” between the U.S. and Iran. As far as we are aware, no
such dialogue has been established.
Just before he retired, Admiral Mullen bemoaned the inevitable, and
unnecessary, risk stemming from the absence of military-to-military
ties: “We haven’t had a connection with Iran since 1979. We are not
talking to Iran, so we don’t understand each other. If something happens
… it’s virtually assured that we won’t get it right — and there will be
miscalculation, which would be extremely dangerous in that part of the
world.”
The following two modest proposals could go a long way toward
avoiding an armed confrontation with Iran — whether accidental or
provoked by any who may actually wish to precipitate hostilities
involving the U.S. in the area of the Persian Gulf.
1 – Establish a direct communications link between U.S. and Iranian
naval commanders in the Persian Gulf area and also between top military
officials in Washington and Tehran, in order to reduce the danger of
accident, miscalculation, or provocation.
2 – Launch immediate negotiations by top Iranian and American naval officers to conclude an incidents-at-sea protocol.
A communications link has historically proven its merit during times
of high tension between potential enemies. The Cuban missile crisis of
1962 underscored the need for instantaneous communications at senior
levels, and a “hot line” between Washington and Moscow was established
the following year.
That direct link played a crucial role in preventing the spread of
war in the Middle East during the Six-Day War in early June 1967.
Another useful precedent is the “Incidents-at-Sea” agreement between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow in May 1972. That was
another time of considerable tension between the two countries,
including several inadvertent naval encounters that could well have
escalated. The agreement sharply reduced the likelihood of such
incidents.
We would regard with suspicion any who would oppose such common-sense
measures to prevent escalation. A number of U.S. commanders in the
Persian Gulf have favored such steps in the past, according to press
reports. And, as indicated above, Admiral Mullen appealed explicitly for
military-to-military dialogue.
The U.S. military’s feasibility analysis regarding an
incidents-at-sea agreement is now with the Senate Armed Services
Committee. At a bare minimum, such an agreement should be concluded as
expeditiously as possible. We strongly urge you to marshal White House
pressure behind getting that done.
If this promising initiative is delayed or tabled, we respectfully
suggest that you consider ways to use your executive power to implement
whatever steps might be possible to establish direct communication
channels with appropriate Iranian authorities immediately.
For Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity
Kathleen Christison, former CIA analyst
Ray Close, former CIA Chief of Station, Saudi Arabia
Phil Geraldi, former CIA operations officer
David MacMichael, former history professor, CIA analyst, and estimates officer, National Intelligence Council
Tom Maertens, former Foreign Service Officer and National Security Council Director for Non-Proliferation
Ray McGovern, former US Army infantry/intelligence officer and CIA analyst
Elizabeth Murray, former Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Near East
Paul Pillar, former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East
Coleen Rowley, former FBI Special Agent and Minneapolis Division Counsel
Lawrence Wilkerson, Col., US Army (ret.) and former Chief of Staff, Department of State
Ann Wright, Col., US Army Reserve (ret.) and former Foreign Service Officer
