Part 5: Manipulating Sequoia Results Cartridges could be easy in
Maricopa County, AZ
Sequoia Part 5: Even with
original legitimate firmware inside the results cartridges can be easily hacked.
Results Cartridges are used for transmitting the ballot definition and then
transmitting the election results from the precinct to the WinEDS central
WinEDS is an “election data
system” used for preparing ballot definitions for Sequoia voting machines before
elections, and for cumulating results from Sequoia Results Cartridges which are
used for transmitting the ballot definition and colleting the results.
It is easy to physically and
electronically manipulate Results Cartridges, either to turn them into other
types of cartridges, or to change the votes in them. Results cartridges are very
insecure against tampering with the votes stored inside.
The precinct results cartridges
also called memory packs from the Sequoia Optech Eagle optical scans are
delivered to one 22 collection centers for the 1,142 precincts in Maricopa.
In Maricopa the Results Cartridge
traditionally has been delivered by one poll worker in plastic pink bubble wrap
bag with no seal, which is not in accordance with the procedures outlined in the
Secretary of State’s Elections Procedures Manual. This is outrageous and breaks
the chain of custody. The Cartridge also
be used to upload a Vote-stealing computer viruses could effect all
Princeton University computer
Scientist wrote: “…a simple program that runs on an ordinary personal computer,
to change votes inside the candidate-total files (and ballot-image files) stored
in a Results Cartridge. When the altered Results Cartridge is inserted into
WinEDS for tabulation, WinEDS notices nothing amiss about the fraudulent
“It is possible to make a simple
device that changes the votes in a Results Cartridge. This device could be as
small as a package of cigarettes. One would plug this device into the Results
Cartridge, and remove it after 2 or 3 seconds. The whole process could be done
unobtrusively in 5 seconds. In that time the device could read the votes
(candidate totals and audit trail) from the cartridge, and write fraudulent data
(candidate totals and audit trail) to the cartridge.”
FROM THE PRINCETON REPORT:
20 Vote-stealing computer viruses
can infect AVC Advantage and WinEDS page 61
21 Viruses can propagate through
the AVC Advantage page63
22 Viruses can propagate through
WinEDS computers page 64
23 WinEDS computers have severe
security vulnerabilies and are routinely connected to the Internet page
In summary, (in 40.8) once a
Results Cartridge leaves the voting machine, it is immediately susceptible to
modification of vote data.
For complete Princeton University
report and 90 minute video go to:
Part 1: Those with access can
also hack with programmed ROM chip
Sequoia Part 1: Princeton University report
released (10/17/2008) Video Excerpt of Shocking report on how it could be done
is demonstrated on the Sequoia ABC Advantage voting machine. However, WinEDS
central tabulator exchanges data before and after the election. This suggests that the data formats are at
least similar if not identical.
The report states: “Once installed, the fraudulent
firmware is practically impossible to detect… Once installed on a voting
machine, the fraudulent firmware can steal votes in election after election
without any additional effort; The AVC Advantage is vulnerable to hacks
(fraudulent manipulations) in several different ways; Some of these hacks take
the form of viruses that can automatically propagate themselves from one voting
machine to another…”
that wasn't bad enough, the Princeton study of the Sequoia system proves an even
more blatant form of certification fraud: getting a system certified with one
set of hardware and software, and then making undeclared changes. One smaller voting system manufacturer
(“Advanced Voting Solutions”) has been thrown out in disgrace as a voting system
supplier over this issue already.
The Sequoia voting machines tested in
this video by the Princeton team are the older "Advantage" optical scanners. What we use in Maricopa county, Arizona are the slightly newer (mid 1990s-era)
and were originally ES&S
equipment (Model 100 (184.108.40.206) and Model 150/550 (220.127.116.11). In 2006 they were
converted into Sequoia Optech Eagle (1.28/1.50).
County’s Central count scanner Model 650 (18.104.22.168) all refitted with Sequoia
software and now
called the Optech
400-C central count tabulator with (WINETP Firmware version 1.10.5). . The Insight precinct count units,
memory pack readers and memory packs are all new with the Sequoia Memory Pack
Reader (MPR) (2.15).
public records requests have shown that Sequoia has committed misconduct in the
certification process for their overall system by withholding a software
component (the ballot layout generator) from all Federal and state level (ANY
state) certification. In short, that means only Sequoia knows how their voting
system works, legally an anathema in AZ and most other states. “Certification”
means an outside testing agency reviewed the system.
Shows how the changed ROM chip works correctly in Logic-and-Accuracy testing
mode. However, in Official Election mode vote-stealing firmware could be
programmed move votes from one candidates total to another while taking care not
to change the totals.
Part 2: The Princeton
University report released (10/17/2008) shows how the changed ROM chip works
correctly in Logic-and-Accuracy testing mode. However, in Official Election mode
vote-stealing firmware could be programmed move votes from one candidates total
to another while taking care not to change the totals.
Then in official
election mode, for every voter before or after the nth voter, the program does
nothing. It waits until the 20th voter casts a vote (a real fraud would wait
until the 150th voter or even higher, to better distinguish a real election from
Part 3: Altered results are
easily exported into Sequoia’s WinEDS central
Part 3: Verification supports
the hacked ROM chip with altered results that are easily exported into Sequoia’s
WinEDS central tabulator program.
Because both systems exchange data before
and after the election with the Sequoia WinEDS central tabulator, this suggests
that the data formats are at least similar if not identical in all Sequoia's
equipment and Software.
danger of fraudulent firmware is widely recognized by nationally experts. It is
well known how to design a vote-stealing program so that it can avoid detection:
the program takes care not to cheat in any circumstance where someone can
compare the actual votes cast with the program’s computed results.
engineering allows construction of fraudulent firmware even without access to
trade-secret source code.
vulnerabilities in WinEDS 3.1 which is also used in Maricopa County, Arizona.
is an “election data system” used for preparing ballot definitions for Sequoia
voting machines before elections, and for cumulating results from Sequoia voting
machines after elections.
The Princeton University
report Vote-stealing firmware can avoid detection.
The WinEDS election-management software is known to be insecure, based on
studies done by the State of California and now in the Princeton examination it was noticed some of the same weaknesses in WinEDS that were
previously reported elsewhere.
No 4 as of this time.
John Brakey, co-founder of AUDIT-AZ (Americans
United for Democracy, Integrity, and Transparency in Elections, Arizona) &
Co-Coordinator Investigations for Election Defense Alliance http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/about_john_brakey
5947 S Placita Picacho El Diablo
Tucson, AZ 85706
New Cell 520-414-0167
EDA & AUDIT-AZ’s
Mission: to restore public ownership and oversight of elections, work to ensure
the fundamental right of every American citizen to vote, and to have each vote
counted as intended in a secure, transparent, impartial, and independently
audited election process.
"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful,
committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever
has." Margaret Mead
"Make yourself sheep and the wolves will eat you." --
“There is no safety for honest men except by believing all
possible evil of evil men.” -- Edmund Burke