Article Image

Arizona - Maricopa County - Elections (COUNTING of Ballots Started Today)

Written by Subject: Voting - Election Integrity
(An email from one of the Maricopa County's election observers for the Libertarian Party)
 
 
Sequoia Part 5: Manipulating Sequoia Results Cartridges could be easy in Maricopa County, AZ
 
 
Sequoia Part 5: Even with original legitimate firmware inside the results cartridges can be easily hacked. Results Cartridges are used for transmitting the ballot definition and then transmitting the election results from the precinct to the WinEDS central tabulator computer.
 
WinEDS is an “election data system” used for preparing ballot definitions for Sequoia voting machines before elections, and for cumulating results from Sequoia Results Cartridges which are used for transmitting the ballot definition and colleting the results.
 
It is easy to physically and electronically manipulate Results Cartridges, either to turn them into other types of cartridges, or to change the votes in them. Results cartridges are very insecure against tampering with the votes stored inside.
 
The precinct results cartridges also called memory packs from the Sequoia Optech Eagle optical scans are delivered to one 22 collection centers for the 1,142 precincts in Maricopa. 
 
In Maricopa the Results Cartridge traditionally has been delivered by one poll worker in plastic pink bubble wrap bag with no seal, which is not in accordance with the procedures outlined in the Secretary of State’s Elections Procedures Manual. This is outrageous and breaks the chain of custody.  The Cartridge also be used to upload a Vote-stealing computer viruses could effect all results. 
 
Princeton University computer Scientist wrote: “…a simple program that runs on an ordinary personal computer, to change votes inside the candidate-total files (and ballot-image files) stored in a Results Cartridge. When the altered Results Cartridge is inserted into WinEDS for tabulation, WinEDS notices nothing amiss about the fraudulent data.”
 
“It is possible to make a simple device that changes the votes in a Results Cartridge. This device could be as small as a package of cigarettes. One would plug this device into the Results Cartridge, and remove it after 2 or 3 seconds. The whole process could be done unobtrusively in 5 seconds. In that time the device could read the votes (candidate totals and audit trail) from the cartridge, and write fraudulent data (candidate totals and audit trail) to the cartridge.”
 
FROM THE PRINCETON REPORT:
20 Vote-stealing computer viruses can infect AVC Advantage and WinEDS page 61
21 Viruses can propagate through the AVC Advantage page63
22 Viruses can propagate through WinEDS computers page 64
23 WinEDS computers have severe security vulnerabilies and are routinely connected to the Internet page 67
 
In summary, (in 40.8) once a Results Cartridge leaves the voting machine, it is immediately susceptible to modification of vote data.
 
For complete Princeton University report and 90 minute video go to:
 
 
Sequoia Part 1: Those with access can also hack with programmed ROM chip
 
Sequoia Part 1: Princeton University report released (10/17/2008) Video Excerpt of Shocking report on how it could be done is demonstrated on the Sequoia ABC Advantage voting machine. However, WinEDS central tabulator exchanges data before and after the election.  This suggests that the data formats are at least similar if not identical.
 
The report states: “Once installed, the fraudulent firmware is practically impossible to detect… Once installed on a voting machine, the fraudulent firmware can steal votes in election after election without any additional effort; The AVC Advantage is vulnerable to hacks (fraudulent manipulations) in several different ways; Some of these hacks take the form of viruses that can automatically propagate themselves from one voting machine to another…”
 
If that wasn't bad enough, the Princeton study of the Sequoia system proves an even more blatant form of certification fraud: getting a system certified with one set of hardware and software, and then making undeclared changes.  One smaller voting system manufacturer (“Advanced Voting Solutions”) has been thrown out in disgrace as a voting system supplier over this issue already.

The Sequoia voting machines tested in this video by the Princeton team are the older "Advantage" optical scanners.  What we use in Maricopa county, Arizona are the slightly newer (mid 1990s-era) and were originally ES&S equipment (Model 100 (5.0.0.0) and Model 150/550 (2.1.1.0). In 2006 they were converted into Sequoia Optech Eagle (1.28/1.50).
 
Maricopa County’s Central count scanner Model 650 (1.2.0.0) all refitted with Sequoia software and now called the Optech 400-C central count tabulator with (WINETP Firmware version 1.10.5).  . The Insight precinct count units, memory pack readers and memory packs are all new with the Sequoia Memory Pack Reader (MPR) (2.15).
 
Previous public records requests have shown that Sequoia has committed misconduct in the certification process for their overall system by withholding a software component (the ballot layout generator) from all Federal and state level (ANY state) certification. In short, that means only Sequoia knows how their voting system works, legally an anathema in AZ and most other states. “Certification” means an outside testing agency reviewed the system.
 
Much of our work in Maricopa on Sequoia is base on our finding from the February 06 Presidential Preference Election - FULL REPORT:  http://www.bbvdocs.org/sequoia/Maricopa-County-Elections-Report.pdf   (5,769 KB)
 
For complete Princeton University report and 90 minute video go to: http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/advantage/
  
 
 
Sequoia Part 2: Shows how the changed ROM chip works correctly in Logic-and-Accuracy testing mode. However, in Official Election mode vote-stealing firmware could be programmed move votes from one candidates total to another while taking care not to change the totals. 
 
Sequoia Part 2: The Princeton University report released (10/17/2008) shows how the changed ROM chip works correctly in Logic-and-Accuracy testing mode. However, in Official Election mode vote-stealing firmware could be programmed move votes from one candidates total to another while taking care not to change the totals.
Then in official election mode, for every voter before or after the nth voter, the program does nothing. It waits until the 20th voter casts a vote (a real fraud would wait until the 150th voter or even higher, to better distinguish a real election from a test.

For complete Princeton University report and 90 minute video go to: http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/adva...
 
 
Sequoia Part 3: Altered results are easily exported into Sequoia’s WinEDS central tabulator
 
 
 
Sequoia Part 3: Verification supports the hacked ROM chip with altered results that are easily exported into Sequoia’s WinEDS central tabulator program.
 
Because both systems exchange data before and after the election with the Sequoia WinEDS central tabulator, this suggests that the data formats are at least similar if not identical in all Sequoia's equipment and Software.
 
The danger of fraudulent firmware is widely recognized by nationally experts. It is well known how to design a vote-stealing program so that it can avoid detection: the program takes care not to cheat in any circumstance where someone can compare the actual votes cast with the program’s computed results.
 
Reverse engineering allows construction of fraudulent firmware even without access to trade-secret source code.
 
Security vulnerabilities in WinEDS 3.1 which is also used in Maricopa County, Arizona.
 
WinEDS is an “election data system” used for preparing ballot definitions for Sequoia voting machines before elections, and for cumulating results from Sequoia voting machines after elections.
 
The Princeton University report Vote-stealing firmware can avoid detection.
 
Summary: The WinEDS election-management software is known to be insecure, based on studies done by the State of California and now in the Princeton examination it was noticed some of the same weaknesses in WinEDS that were previously reported elsewhere.
 
For complete Princeton University report and 90 minute video go to:  http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/advantage/
 
Category:  News & Politics
 
 
 
No 4 as of this time.
 
 
John Brakey, co-founder of AUDIT-AZ (Americans United for Democracy, Integrity, and Transparency in Elections, Arizona) & Co-Coordinator Investigations for Election Defense Alliance http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/about_john_brakey
5947 S Placita Picacho El Diablo 
Tucson, AZ  85706
        520-578-5678
New Cell 520-414-0167
John’s AUDITAZ@cox.net
 
EDA & AUDIT-AZ’s Mission:  to restore public ownership and oversight of elections, work to ensure the fundamental right of every American citizen to vote, and to have each vote counted as intended in a secure, transparent, impartial, and independently audited election process.
 
"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has."   Margaret Mead
"Make yourself sheep and the wolves will eat you." -- Benjamin Franklin
“There is no safety for honest men except by believing all possible evil of evil men.” -- Edmund Burke
 
 

Join us on our Social Networks:

 

Share this page with your friends on your favorite social network:

Candles in the Dark