Most likely this will be in abbreviated episodes of limited war, but possessing nevertheless a potential to widen regionally, should the US (and Israel) elect to sharply escalate.

The new phase involves risk of course, yet Iran holds the high cards of an ability to impose disproportionately heavier damage upon Gulf infrastructure as retaliation for any hurt inflicted upon it — and the awareness that the West is edging ever closer to dropping off the energy "cliff."

The three pillars underlying this shift are firstly, confidence that Iran will not (and cannot) be shifted from its hold over Hormuz, and that in consolidating its administrative structures there, the reality of Iran's hold over Hormuz will increasingly be assimilated by states, and reflected in their coming to terms with Iranian-Omani control.

Associated with this core principle is Iran's implementation of escalated deterrence vis á vis the American naval blockade. Any attempt to intercept or attack Iranian vessels or interfere with the Strait's administration will be met with increasingly harsher ripostes. Ultimately this policy may lead to Iran imposing increasing levels of damage to US naval vessels – another friction point.

On 3 June, for example, the US fired a hellfire missile at an Iranian oil tanker near the Strait of Hormuz. In response, a US-owned (or partly-owned) ship, The Panaya, was struck with missiles. Additionally Iran launched three waves of cruise missiles at the US air and helicopter base in Kuwait from where the attack had originated. Images have emerged of serious damage at Kuwait international airport too (although the cause of the damage remains disputed).

The second underlying principle affecting this shift simply reflects Iranian disdain for Trump's continuous inflating of demands, exaggerated threats (which palpably fall short of US capacities), together with his continual zigzagging and contemptuous rhetoric towards Iran.

The Iranian leadership has concluded, it seems, that compromise will likely not be forthcoming, and that it is better to cut the "negotiations" rather "than continue the pointless bad-faith negotiations with a deceitful and decrepit American regime," as the New York Times has termed the Iran "negotiations" — suggesting that the "deal chaos" is not a singular glitch by Trump confined to the Iran issue, but rather is a consistent pattern of dysfunctionality repeating itself across virtually all of Trump's "peace" initiatives.

Behind Iran's decision to suspend talks however, likely lies the gradually dawning clarity, seeping out from Israeli and American statements and analysis, that the true objective of the 28 February US-Israeli sneak attack was never regime change per se — aiming to swap out Iranian "hardliners" for a "Delcy Rodrigues"-style more moderate leader; but was intended rather, to bring about Iran's complete destruction and fracturing — an insight that was bound to shift Iran's calculus.

This insight has consolidated public support for the Islamic Republic hugely, and at the same time has turned the war into an existential struggle to preserve the ethical values of the Revolution. Seen from this optic, there is little for Iran to discuss with Trump, bar some future modus vivendi — as and when, Washington understands that it is boxed in, and that new realism takes a hold.