We "learn" from Donilon that Carter left a legacy of peace in the Middle East with the Camp David Accords, enhanced U.S. security in the broader Persian Gulf region by proclaiming the Carter Doctrine, deftly managed our relationship with China by advancing the "one China" policy and ensured the ultimate downfall of the Soviet Union. One wonders why American voters overwhelmingly rejected Carter in 1980 after he accomplished so much (according to Donilon).

There was a time when Democrats had the courage to distance themselves from a failed foreign policy by a president of their own party—and that time was in the late 1970s. The list of prominent Democrats who supported GOP candidate Ronald Reagan over Carter in the 1980 election because of Carter's failed foreign policy was long and distinguished, and included the likes of Paul Nitze, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Max Kampelman, Norman Podhoretz, Lane Kirkland, Eugene Rostow, Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, and Elliot Abrams, among others. Many of these were known then as "Scoop Jackson Democrats," named after the long-serving Senator from the state of Washington Henry M. Jackson, a key member of the Armed Services Committee. Scoop Jackson was one of the nation's chief critics of détente, especially as practiced by the Carter administration. Scoop Jackson was on Reagan's transition team. Kirkpatrick, Rostow, Perle, Abrams, Pipes and Nitze all joined Reagan's national security team.

The first major Democratic salvo against Carter's foreign policy was fired by Jeane Kirkpatrick in an article in Commentary in 1979 titled "Dictatorships  and Double Standards." Kirkpatrick's first sentence set the theme of the article: "The failure of the Carter administration's foreign policy is now clear to everyone except its architects, and even they must entertain private doubts, from time to time, about a policy whose crowning achievement has been to lay the groundwork for a transfer of the Panama Canal from the United States to a swaggering Latin dictator of Castroite bent." Kirkpatrick criticized Carter for failing to adequately respond to a massive Soviet conventional and military build-up, watching as the Soviets extended their political influence in Africa, Afghanistan, and the Caribbean Sea, and undermining long-time U.S. allies in Nicaragua and Iran to the detriment of U.S. security interests. Carter, she said, wielded the cudgel of "human rights" against America's allies regardless of the strategic consequences.

But even before Kirkpatrick's article, Carter set the theme of his approach to  foreign policy in an address at Notre Dame early in his presidency, when he proclaimed that he "believe[d] in détente with the Soviet Union," and apologized for "abandoning our own values" for those of our adversaries. (The Obama administration, when Donilon was deputy national security adviser, infamously engaged in its own "apology tour"). Carter then uttered a line that wins the prize for foreign policy naivete: "Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear." The Soviets, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and the mullahs in Iran, as well as our allies, were undoubtedly listening.