Willie Nelson is not, to my knowledge, a proponent of any economic cycle theories – though now at 92, he's seen more cycles than most of us. But he was singing back in the 1950s how good things eventually end… and then we quickly start them again.

Debt-driven growth definitely feels good. We all enjoy it immensely as long as it lasts.

Then the lights go out and the party's over. Yes, it starts again, but not until we all stumble around in the dark for a while.

Unfortunately, The Debt Super Cycle is typically at least 80 years so nobody remembers the pain and why we should avoid it. Perhaps in this coming crisis we can do better. We can't avoid it, but we can think about how to deal with it in advance rather than making decisions on the fly like we did during The Great Recession.

I've been reviewing Ray Dalio's latest book, How Countries Go Broke. He shows in exhaustive detail how our current party is quickly approaching its lights-out moment. I can't recommend this book highly enough. If you missed Part 1 and Part 2 of my review series, read them and then read the whole book. The quotes I'm sharing only scratch the surface.

Today we're going to zoom in on that light switch.

Ray's historical research found a specific sequence of events usually defined the cycle-ending crisis. Given where we are now, it may be a good preview of our next few years.

Broken Promises

Before we talk about the final crisis, I want to review a critical distinction Ray found in his research. Debt crises unfold differently depending whether the monetary system is based on hard money or fiat money.

Note that a "hard" currency in this sense doesn't have to be gold, silver, etc. It can be a government-issued currency that's pegged to some other currency the issuing government can't control. This lack of control is the key. Here's Ray:  

"In brief, the way the hard currency cases work is that the governments have made promises to deliver money that they can't print (e.g., gold, silver, or another currency that the parties view as relatively hard, like the dollar). Throughout history, when coming up with these hard currencies that they can't print to pay debts becomes tough, the governments almost always renege on their promises to pay in the currency that they can't print, and the value of their money and the debt payments denominated in it tumble at the moment the promise is broken.