A week ago, in an attempt to calm the market, Goldman's economists published a lengthy, if at times disjointed, report discussing why a crisis in private credit would not lead to another financial crisis.

We are about to find out if they were right. 

Recall that in mid-March, while attention was understandably focused on the Iran war, we explained why Blue Owl's February decision to commence liquidations of loans in its three core private credit funds to fund current and future redemptions, was the industry's "Margin Call" moment, to wit: 

First it was Blue Owl, the largest pure play Private Credit fund with over $300 billion in AUM. The company, the first to face massive redemption demands, refused to gate investors and instead announced it would sell $1.4 billion in private loans (it was unclear which loans were sold, but Goldman suggested that these are likely the best ones so as to find willing buyers, leaving the company with the toxic sludge) from its three BDCs (OBDCII, OBDC and OTIC) at 99.7 cents (a number which was meant to inspire confidence yet was laughable, especially since once of the "buyers" was a related-party insurance company, Kuvare, also owned by Blue Owl), to satisfy redemption requests.