The seabed is legally designated as the "common heritage of mankind," but in practice, it has become a hotly contested frontier.

This is exemplified by the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ), a vast expanse of international seabed located between Hawaii and Mexico rich in polymetallic nodules that contain critical minerals such as nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese.

These resources are more than mere commodities; they are vital components of national strategies for energy independence, technological leadership and strategic deterrence.

Unlike land-based domains, where national borders delineate access, the seabed remains governed by a patchwork of international conventions and non-binding regulatory frameworks.

This legal ambiguity, combined with the CCZ's sheer scale (approximately 4.5 million square kilometers), recasts geography as a determinant of power. Here, the terrain imposes its own rules: no nation can claim legal sovereignty, yet every technologically capable actor can exert functional control.

The strategic function of the seabed lies not in symbolic possession, requiring engagement with multilateral bodies like the International Seabed Authority (ISA), but in continuous operational oversight enforced through submersibles, dredging platforms and state-backed maritime infrastructure.

Through these instruments, nations could transform the legal status of the seabed from a global commons into de facto geopolitical claims, not to share, not to protect, but to secure.

Navigating the seabed divide

No rivalry illustrates the emerging dynamics of seabed geopolitics more vividly than that between the United States and China. These two powers approach deep-sea mining from fundamentally different institutional positions, strategic cultures and timelines.

China, with its disciplined alignment of state power and long-term industrial planning, has embedded itself within ISA's multilateral framework. It holds more seabed exploration licenses than any other country and has cultivated influence within ISA rulemaking bodies.

Chinese actors do not rely on rhetorical commitments to international law; instead, they utilize procedural participation as a mechanism to steer the outcome of regulatory frameworks.

Their objective is clear: to shape the rules before they are finalized, ensuring that China's technological, legal and operational advantages are permanently encoded into the structure of global seabed governance.