The escalation represents a new stage in the regime's long-running effort to cut the public off from the outside world whenever unrest emerges.

Early interference affected roughly 30 percent of Starlink's signal traffic, which rose to more than 80 percent within hours.

Because Starlink relies on GPS for positioning and synchronization, interference at that level has fragmented service into irregular pockets of access, leaving many districts fully disconnected.

Starlink traffic collapsed at the same time as reports of widespread communication loss appeared online.

According to NetBlocks, "Iran's internet blackout is now past the 60-hour mark as national connectivity levels continue to flatline around 1% of ordinary levels."

The militarization of signal disruption extends Iran's censorship strategy beyond traditional online restrictions.

Starlink had been a last-ditch option for journalists, organizers, and citizens seeking to stay connected during government shutdowns. Now, even that fallback is being systematically dismantled.

Governments have interfered with Starlink before, but none have succeeded in cutting off access nationwide. 

The new Iranian blackout appears to mark the first time a state has managed to disrupt the satellite network on such a broad scale inside its own territory.

In Ukraine, Russian electronic warfare units have repeatedly targeted Starlink terminals since 2022, aiming to degrade connectivity for both military and civilian users. 

The attacks have included GPS interference and jamming attempts directed at the Ku-band frequencies that Starlink relies on. 

Ukrainian officials and Elon Musk have confirmed these operations, which have caused intermittent service interruptions and packet loss. However, the disruptions remained localized, typically confined to active frontlines, and never amounted to a full shutdown across the country.